Abstract. Awareness of the need for robustness in distributed systems increases as distributed systems become integral parts of day-to-day systems. Self-stabilizing while tolerating ongoing Byzantine faults are wishful properties of a distributed system. Many distributed tasks (e.g. 
Introduction
On-going faults whose nature is not predictable or that express complex behavior are most suitably addressed in the Byzantine fault model. It is the preferred fault model in order to seal o unexpected behavior within limitations on the number of concurrent faults. Most distributed tasks require the number of concurrent Byzantine faults, f , to abide by the ratio of 3f < n, where n is the network size. See [13] for impossibility results on several consensus related problems such as clock synchronization. Additionally, it makes sense to require systems to resume operation after a major failure without the need for an outside intervention and/or a restart of the system from scratch. E.g. systems may occasionally experience short periods in which more than a third of the nodes are faulty or messages sent by all nodes may be lost for some time due to a network failure.
Such transient violations of the basic fault assumptions may leave the system in an arbitrary state from which the protocol is required to resume in realizing its task. Typically, Byzantine algorithms do not ensure convergence in such cases, as strong assumptions are usually made on the initial state and thus merely focus on preventing Byzantine faults from notably shifting the system state away from the goal. A self-stabilizing algorithm bypasses this limitation by being designed to converge within nite time to a desired state from any initial state.
Thus, even if the system loses its consistency due to a transient violation of the basic fault assumptions (e.g. more than a third of the nodes being faulty, network disconnected, etc.), then once the system becomes coherent again the protocol will successfully realize the task, irrespective of the resumed state of the system. In trying to combine both fault models, Byzantine failures present a special challenge for designing stabilizing algorithms due to the ambition of malicious nodes to incessantly hamper stabilization, as might be indicated by the remarkably few algorithms resilient to both fault models.
We present an algorithm for transforming any Byzantine protocol to its selfstabilizing semi-synchronous counterpart, which is to the best of our knowledge, the rst general scheme to do so for arbitrary protocols in the Byzantine fault model. Our result operates in the semi-synchronous network model typical of Byzantine protocols, though our scheme will also transform any asynchronous algorithm into its self-stabilizing semi-synchronous counterpart. Transient failures can practically be equivalent to the existence of an unbounded number of concurrent Byzantine failures. No distributed algorithm can reach its goal deterministically, in the face of permanent unbounded Byzantine failures, unless digital signatures are used. In a self-stabilizing paradigm, using digital signatures to counter Byzantine nodes exposes the protocols to replay-attack which might empty its usefulness.
Thus, deterministic protocols that tolerate permanent unbounded Byzantine failures by using digital signatures do not guarantee operation from arbitrary states and are thus not self-stabilizing. Hence, in order to self-stabilize and tolerate unbounded Byzantine failures it is essential to assume that eventually the bound on the permanent number of Byzantine failures is less than a third of the network. From this arbitrary state our protocol causes the user's target algorithm to converge eciently. Therefore our result is stronger than just resilience to permanent unbounded Byzantine faults.
The algorithm assumes the existence of a module that delivers synchronized pulses to all the nodes. The function of the pulse synchronization is to align the activities of the participating nodes in a self-stabilizing and fault-tolerant manner. The use of an external pulse module subjects the protocol to a single point of failure. This necessitates an internal pulse mechanism in order to guarantee continuous function of the system at times that the external pulse is missing, which obliterates the benet of circumventing any internal mechanisms with external ones. The only distributed internal protocols that delivers periodic synchronized pulses in a self-stabilizing manner tolerant to Byzantine faults are [7, 8] .
The idea of the algorithm, in a bird's-eye view, is to run at each node, in the background, the self-stabilizing Byzantine protocol that periodically invokes tightly synchronized pulses. Subsequent to a pulse, the node initiates Byzantine agreement on its local application state. This ensures that following some bounded time there is consensus on the local state of every node (inclusive of faulty nodes). All correct nodes then evaluate whether this global application snapshot corresponds to a legal state of the basic program and, if required, collectively reset it at the next pulse.
The overhead of our protocol is O(f ) communication rounds, where f is the actual number of permanent faults, in addition to the time complexity of the transformed non-stabilizing algorithm. We utilize a Byzantine Agreement protocol that works in a time-driven manner that we have presented in [9] , which makes the agreement procedure progress as a function of the actual message transmission times and not the upper bound on the message transmission times.
Consequently, the additional overhead can in eect be very low.
We postulate that the semi-synchronous network model is a very realistic and ubiquitous model that is essentially the underlying setting of overlay networks and even the internet. Our result implies that the semi-synchronous network model allows for a very extensive treatment of dierent models of fault tolerance.
Related Work
There are very few specic protocols that tolerate both transient failures as well as permanent Byzantine faults. In this section we survey most of them.
Towards the end of the section we describe a few general schemes that aim at stabilizing arbitrary asynchronous non fault tolerant algorithms. To the best of our knowledge our result is the only general scheme that transforms an arbitrary Byzantine algorithm into a multitolerant program that is self-stabilizing in the presence of permanent Byzantine failures.
The concept of multitolerance is coined by Kulkarni and Arora [2, 17] to describe the property of a system to tolerate multiple fault-classes. They present a component based method for designing multitolerant programs. It is shown how to step-wise add tolerance to the dierent fault-classes separately. They design as an example a repetitive agreement protocol tolerant to Byzantine failures and to transient failures. Similarly, mutual exclusions for transient and permanent (non Byzantine) faults is designed. In [16] a multitolerant program for distributed reset is designed that tolerates transient and permanent crash failures. It is not shown how the method can be utilized for designing arbitrary algorithms, rather, particular problems are addressed and protocols are specically designed for these problems using the method.
Nesterenko and Arora [20] dene and formalize the notion of local tolerance in a multitolerant fault model of unbounded Byzantine faults that eventually comply with the 3f < n ratio. Local tolerance refers to the property of faults being contained within a certain distance of the faulty nodes so that nodes outside this containment radius are able to eventually attain correct behavior.
They present two locally tolerant Byzantine self-stabilizing protocols for the particular problems of graph coloring and the dining philosophers problem.
Other examples are the two randomized self-stabilizing Byzantine clock synchronization algorithms presented by Dolev and Welch [12] . Both protocols have exponential convergence time. Our deterministic self-stabilizing Byzantine clock synchronization algorithm in [6] converges in linear time
.
Many papers have been published that seek to nd a universal technique to convert an arbitrary asynchronous protocol into a self-stabilizing equivalent.
Thus these works have very limited handling of faults besides the transient faults.
The concept of a self-stabilizing extension of a non-stabilizing protocol is brought by Katz and Perry [15] . They show how to compile an arbitrary asynchronous protocol into a self-stabilizing equivalent by centralized predicate evaluation.
A self-stabilizing version of Chandy-Lamport snapshots that is recurrently executed is developed. The snapshot is evaluated for a global inconsistency and a distributed reset is done if necessary. This is improved by the local checking method of Awerbuch et al., [4] . Kutten and Patt-Shamir [18] present a timeadaptive transformer which stabilizes any non-stabilizing protocol in O(f ) time but on the expense of the space and communication complexities. A stabilizer that takes any o-line or on-line algorithm and compiles a self-stabilizing version of it is presented by Afek and Dolev [1] . The stabilizer has the advantage of being local, whereby local it is meant that as soon as the system enters a corrupt state, that fact is detected and second that the expected computation time lost in recovering from the corrupted state is proportional to the size of the corrupted part of the network. In a seminal paper by Arora and Gouda [3] a distributed reset protocol for shared memory is presented which tolerates fail-stop 1 Note that the pulse synchronization procedure used in [6] has a aw, as pointed out by Mahyar Malekpour from NASA LaRC and Radu Siminiceanu from NIA. A correct version can be found in [8] .
failures. Note that the fail-stop failure assumption (as opposed to the sudden crash faults) makes the protocol non-masking and thus doesn't truly tolerate permanent faults. Moreover it has a relatively costly convergence time.
Gopal and Perry [14] present a framework for unifying process faults and systemic failures, i.e. ongoing faults and self-stabilization. Their scheme works in a fully synchronous system and is a compiler that creates a self-stabilizing version of any fault-tolerant fully synchronous algorithm. They assume the nonstabilizing algorithm works in synchronous rounds. Assuming a fully synchronous system is a strong assumption as it obliterates the need to consider the loss of synchronization of the rounds following a transient failure. Their scheme only assumes the loss of agreement on the round number itself. To overcome this following a systemic (transient) failure, at each round some sort of agreement is done on the round number. They assume the register holding the round number is unbounded, which is not a realistic assumption. In a self-stabilizing scheme a transient failure can cause the register to reach its upper limit. Thus they do not handle the overow and wrap-around of the round number which is a major aw.
The permanent faults that the framework tolerates are any corruption of process code. This may seem very similar to Byzantine faults but the dierence hinges on a subtle but signicant dissimilarity. It is assumed that corruption of process code cannot result in malicious or two-faced behavior whereas Byzantine failures allow for any adversary behavior. This dierence results in the FLM result [13] for Byzantine behavior, in which at least 3f + 1 nodes are required to mask f failures. Conversely, corruption of process code imposes no such bound on the number of concurrent failures.
Note that being in an illegal global state is a stable predicate of the system state of a non-stabilizing program as otherwise it would either be self-stabilizing or not have the closure property that is required of any rational non-stabilizing algorithm (i.e. if in a legal state then stay in a legal state). A more general way of presenting our scheme is as a self-stabilizing Byzantine method for detection of stable predicates in semi-synchronous networks (see [21] for non fault-tolerant predicate detection in semi-synchronous networks). Distributed reset is just one particular action that can be done upon the detection of a certain predicate.
Examples of other predicate detection uses are deadlock detection, threshold detection, progress detection, termination detection, state variance detection (e.g. clock synchronization), among others.
Model and Denitions
The environment is a semi-synchronous network model of n nodes that communicate by exchanging messages. We assume that the message passing allows for an authenticated identity of the senders. The communication network does not guarantee any order on messages among dierent nodes. Individual nodes have no access to a central clock and there is no external pulse system. The hardware clock rate (referred to as the physical timers) of correct nodes has a bounded drift, ρ, from real-time rate. When the system is not coherent then there can be an unbounded number of concurrent Byzantine faulty nodes, the turnover rate between faulty and non-faulty nodes can be arbitrarily large and the communication network may behave arbitrarily. Denition 1. A node is non-faulty at times that it complies with the following: 1. Obeys a global constant 0 < ρ << 1 (typically ρ ≈ 10 −6 ), such that for every real-time interval [u, v] :
2. Operates according to the instructed protocol. 3. Processes any message of the instructed protocol within π real-time units of arrival time.
A node is considered faulty if it violates any of the above conditions. We allow for Byzantine behavior of the faulty nodes. A faulty node may recover from its faulty behavior once it resumes obeying the conditions of a non-faulty node. For consistency reasons, the correction is not immediate but rather takes a certain amount of time during which the non-faulty node is still not counted as a correct node, although it supposedly behaves correctly 2 . We later specify the time-length of continuous non-faulty behavior required of a recovering node to be considered correct. Denition 2. The communication network is non-faulty at periods that it complies with the following:
1. Any message sent by any non-faulty node arrives at every non-faulty node within δ real-time units; 2. All messages sent by a non-faulty node and received by a non-faulty node obey FOFI order.
Basic notations:
Thus, when the communication network is non-faulty, d is the upper bound on the elapsed real-time from the sending of a message by a non-faulty node until it is received and processed by every correct node.
A pulse is an internal event targeted to happen in tight synchrony at all correct nodes. A Cycle is the ideal time interval length between two successive pulses that a node invokes, as given by the user. The actual cycle length has upper and lower bounds and can be shortened to cycle min by faulty nodes. (see [8] for the details of the pulse synchronization). Note that n, f and Cycle are xed constants and thus non-faulty nodes do not initialize with arbitrary values of these constants. It is required that Cycle is chosen s.t. cycle min is large enough to allow our protocol to terminate in between pulses.
A recovering node should be considered correct only once it has been continuously non-faulty for enough time to enable it to go through a complete synchronization process. This is the time it takes, from any state, to complete two concomitant pulses that are in synchrony with all other correct nodes.
Denition 3. A node is correct following pulse_conv + 2 · Cycle + σ real-time of continuous non-faulty behavior.
Denition 4. The system is said to be coherent at times that it complies with the following:
1. At least n − f of the nodes are correct, where n ≥ 3f + 1; 2. The communication network has been continuously non-faulty for at least pulse_conv + 2 · Cycle + σ real-time units.
The reference to correct instead of non-faulty nodes circumvents the ability of the turnover rate between faulty and non-faulty behavior of nodes to hinder the system from ever converging to a legal state. Hence, if the system is not coherent then there can be an unbounded number of concurrent faulty nodes;
the turnover rate between faulty and non-faulty nodes can be arbitrarily large and the communication network may behave arbitrarily. When the system is coherent, then the network and a large enough fraction of the nodes (n − f ) have been non-faulty for a suciently long time period for the pre-conditions for convergence of the protocol to hold. The assumption in this paper, as underlies any other self-stabilizing algorithm, is that eventually the system becomes coherent.
Note that being coherent does not imply that the system is in a legal state.
The self-stabilization paradigm assumes that all variables and program registers are volatile and thus prone to corruption or can initialize with arbitrary assignments. Conversely, it assumes that the code (the instructed protocol) is not dynamic and can thus be stored on non-volatile or non-corruptible storage. Furthermore, it is assumed in the paradigm that any access to an external module utilized by the system is eventually restored. E.g., any dependency on continu- Denition 6. A normal execution is an execution whose initial state is normal and has entirely occurred while the system is coherent.
Denition 7. A global application state is said to be legal if it could occur in a normal execution.
Denition 8. A legal execution is an execution that is a non-empty sux of a normal execution.
We dene N E, (N E ⊂ E), to be the set of normal executions of P (also denoted N E(P )). Equivalently, we dene LE, (LE ⊂ E), to be the set of legal executions of P (denoted LE(P ) respectively). The legal global states and the set of legal executions are determined by the particular task in the specic system and its respective normal executions. This cannot be characterized in general terms regardless of the actual problem denition that program P seeks to solve.
The self-stabilization of a system is informally dened by the requirement that every execution in E has a non-empty sux in LE. We adopt the denitions of a self-stabilizing extension of a non-stabilizing program from [15] : Denition 9. A projection of a global state onto a subset of the variables and the messages on the channels is the value of the state for those variables and messages.
Denition 10. Program Q is an extension of program P if for each global state in N E(Q) there is a projection onto all variables and messages of P such that the resulting set of sequences is identical to N E(P ), up to stuttering 5 .
Note that when one considers only those portions of Q's global state that correspond to P's variables and messages and if repetitions of states are ignored, then the legal executions of P and Q are identical. Thus, a state of Q is a legal state of Q i the projection onto P is a legal state of P. The program P to be extended is called the basic program. Denition 11. Program Q is a self-stabilizing extension of a program P if Q is an extension of P and any execution in E(Q) has a non-empty sux whose projection onto P is in LE(P).
Thus, informally, if Q is a self-stabilizing extension of P then the projection of Q onto P is self-stabilizing. Therefore we refer to Q as a stabilizer of P. Our scheme stabilizes any Byzantine protocol that has such events (sampling points) during the execution, which can be identied by checking the program counter and local state. Otherwise, it is required that the basic program signals when to read and report the local state. We argue that this denition covers an extensive set of protocols. Programs that work in round structure is just a specic and easily identiable example of such protocols. We assume for simplicity that the sampling points are taken at least 4σ apart on the same node in order to be able to dierentiate between adjacent sampling points due to the synchronization uncertainties. It remains open whether this bound is really required. In Section 5
we give a detailed example of how to extend a specic clock synchronization algorithm that does not operate in a round structure.
Note that we do not aim at achieving a consistent global snapshot in the Chandy-Lamport sense (see [5] ), which is not clearly dened in the Byzantine fault model. For our purposes a projection of the local state to the application state suces in order to detect states that violate the assumptions of the basic program on its initial states, which rendered it non-stabilizing in the rst place.
Generally, the extension of the basic program is established through a usersupplied wrapper function, so called because it wraps the basic program and functions as an interface between the basic program and the stabilizer. Note that the wrapper procedures must be supplied by the implementor. This is because it is a semantic matter to determine whether the global application state predicate indicates an illegal state that violates the assumptions of the basic program. For the sake of modularity and readability the wrapper is divided into two distinct modules according to its two main functions. The GetState_Wrapper() module interprets the local state of the basic program and returns the local state at the sampling points. The EvalState_Wrapper() module evaluates the agreed global application snapshot and determines whether it is legal with respect to the application. It also instructs a node how to repair its local application state as a function of the global application snapshot, should a node detect that its local application state is inconsistent with the legal global application snapshot. ∆ ≥ σ, because the pulse skew may cause the nodes to reach the sampling points up to σ real-time units of each other. R5: There exists a value Σ, such that in every time-window that is at least some Σ real-time units long every correct node has at least one sampling point.
This value also covers the initialization period of the basic program.
R6: The set of legal application states of the basic program can be determined by evaluating a predicate on the application state variables. An additional requirement is that if up to f non-faulty nodes detect that their own local state is inconsistent with a legal global application snapshot then it can be repaired without needing a global reset 7 .
R7: The basic program has a closure property with regards to the legal global states. I.e. if the system is in a legal state and the system is coherent then it stays in a legal state as long as the system stays coherent.
To formalize the intuition we give a more rened presentation of the algorithm:
At pulse event Do /* received the internal pulse event */ AS := {(p, S, T ) | Byz_Agreement returned S =⊥}; /* add agreed state */ 13 .
Let pivot be the f +1 st node in Agr_nodes, in ascending order by their min. Ti;
/* seek cluster of ≥ n−f values whose Timers within 2∆ of each other */ 16 . reset := EvalState_Wrapper(globAppSnapshot);/*reset,repair or nothing*/
End
The internal pulse event is delivered by the pulse synchronization procedure (presented in [8] ). The synchronization of the pulses ensures that the ByzStabilizer procedure is invoked within σ real-time units of its invocation at all other correct nodes. Note that we do not assume any correlation between the pulse cycle and any internal cycles or rounds of the basic program. Hence at the time of the pulse, the basic program may be in any of its states. The Byzantine agreement procedure used, Byz_Agreement, is essentially the consensus procedure of [9] . We present its agreement equivalent in Section 7. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Example of Stabilizing a Non-stabilizing Algorithm
To illustrate our method and to elucidate its generality we will provide a specic example of the conversion of a well known non-stabilizing algorithms to its stabilizing counterpart.
To stabilize the protocol using our scheme the following needs to be identied: the application state, the sampling points, the bound ∆ on the real-time skew between correct nodes' sampling points in a legal state, the GetState_Wrapper procedure, the EvalState_Wrapper procedure and how it characterizes the legal states and how it does a repair, the initialization of the basic program following a global reset, the required minimal length of the cycle.
Consider the Byzantine clock synchronization algorithm in [10] . Informally that algorithm operates as follows: The processes resynchronize their clocks every PER time period. A process expects the time at the next resynchronization to equal ET . When a process's local time reaches ET it broadcasts a (signed) message stating the time is ET . Alternatively, when a process receives such a message from f + 1 distinct nodes it knows that at least one correct node advanced its local time to ET and thus it resets its clock to ET . Note that this algorithm does not utilize a rounds structure.
It is interesting to note that the candidate protocol above uses signed messages in a way that does not comply with R2, because replay of signed messages from previous incarnations of the protocol can destroy the synchronization of the clocks of the correct nodes. One can transform the protocol to conform with R2, by using Byzantine Agreement instead of sending signed messages. The diculty above is inherent in stabilizing protocols that use digital signatures.
The application state will be comprised of the ET variable only. Practically any point throughout the inter-PER period avoiding the vicinity of the resynchronization events is safe for sampling. For illustrative purposes we will dene a sampling point at every time that equals ET + PER/2. It is clear that the ET variable is quiescent around this point when the algorithm is in a legal global state.
The algorithm can be initialized with the required bound of σ real-time units between the dierent nodes. This will not aect the precision of the algorithm which will stay d. That will yield a real-time skew between correct nodes' sampling points in a legal state of ∆ = d + PER · (1 + ρ).
The sampling point is identied by the GetState_Wrapper procedure through the local state event of clocktime = ET + PER/2, at which the ET value is read into the localAppState variable.
The EvalState_Wrapper procedure identies the legal application states as those in which there are at least n − f identical ET values. A repair is done by a node by setting its ET value to equal the other n − f or more ET values in the application snapshot if it was evaluated as legal.
Following a reset a node should initialize the algorithm by setting its ET variable to some pre-dened value, e.g. ET = 0. As mentioned before, the initial skew of σ will aect the accuracy but not the precision, as early and fast nodes will reach their subsequent ET before the others, but the others late and slow nodes will set their clock accordingly upon receiving f + 1 messages which is uncorrelated to the initialization skew.
The required minimal cycle length equals PER/2 in case the pulse correlates with the reading of the sampling point and some correct nodes will have to wait until the next sampling point. The protocol then needs to allow for a full
Byzantine agreement to terminate, in addition to a few round-trip rounds.
Thus the required minimal cycle length equals PER/2 + (2f + 3) rounds.
Analysis
We require Cycle to be chosen s.t. cycle min > σ + Σ + agreement_duration.
From an arbitrary state in which the system is coherent it can take up to pulse_conv real-time until the pulses synchronize. Subsequent to the pulses it can take in the order of Σ + agreement_duratione real-time to reach a decision on a reset. The steady-state time complexity equals the time overhead from the pulse until the EvalState_Wrapper procedure terminates. Again this equals about Σ + agreement_duration time. With few faults and/or a fast network this becomes in the order of Σ, which is largely determined by the user and can be as low as 4d if the basic program allows for frequent sampling points. The message complexity is expressed in point-to-point messages. The message complexity of the steady state is roughly n 2 messages for the pulse synchronization procedure, and f · n 2 for the agreement algorithm.
Note that the agreement instances initiated by correct nodes will always terminate within 2 communication rounds, this is due to the early stopping property of the consensus algorithm which terminates within 2 rounds if all correct nodes hold the same initial agreement value. Thus the communication complexity is that of the actual number of faulty nodes.
The algorithm is fault-containing, in the sense that if faulty nodes behave correctly such that a correct node detects that it is not in synch with a legal global snapshot then the node can repair itself. Thus even though we present a reset-based protocol, repair is done up to a certain amount of concurrent faults. This is because our protocol is Byzantine resilient, thus a non-Byzantine fault or inconsistency will be masked by the protocol while the aected non-faulty node can perform a repair. Only if there should be more than f faults and inconsistencies would a system reset be performed.
The algorithm is also time-adaptive, the number of rounds executed in every cycle equals the number of actual faults, f . This is due to the early-stopping feature of the agreement algorithm which terminates within f ≤ f rounds.
Note that if solving a certain Byzantine problem can be reduced to consensus (or agreement) on the future value of the global state at the next pulse, (e.g.
token circulation, see [9] ), as opposed to reaching agreement on the current value of every node, then the agreement algorithm presented can be used to achieve 7 Appendix -The Byz_Agreement Procedure
The Byzantine Agreement module extends the approach taken in [9] in using explicit time bounds in order to address the variety of potential problems that may arise when the system is stabilizing.
We assume that timers of correct nodes are always withinσ of each other.
More specically, we assume that nodes have timers that reset periodically, say at intervals ≤ Cycle . Let T p (t) be the reading of the timer at node p at real-time t. We thus assume that there exists a bound such that for every real-time t, when the system is coherent,
The boundσ includes all drift factors that may occur among the timers of correct nodes during that period. When the timers are reset to zero it might be, that for a short period of time, the timers may be further apart. The pulse synchronization algorithm [8] satises the above assumptions and implies that σ > d.
We use the following notations in the description of the agreement procedure:
Letd be the duration of time equal to (σ + d) · (1 + ρ) time units on a correct node's timer. Intuitively,d can be assumed to be a duration of a phase on a correct node's timer.
The consensus-broadcast and the broadcast primitives are dened in [9] . Note that an accept is issued within the broadcast primitive.
The Byz_Agreement algorithm is presented in a somewhat dierent style.
Each step has a condition attached to it, if the condition holds and the timer value assumption holds, then the step is to be executed. Notice that only the step needs to take place at a specic timer value. It is assumed that the internal procedures invoked as a result of the Byz_Agreement procedure are implicitly associated with the agreement procedure.
Algorithm Byz_Agreement on (p, V al, T )
/* invoked at node q */ if accepted (p, v , T +d, 1) and r − 1 distinct messages (pi, v , T +d, i) where ∀i, j 2 ≤ i ≤ r, and pi = pj = p then value := v ; Proof. The proof follows very closely to the proof of the Byz-Consensus algorithm in [9] . Notice, that there is a dierence of oned resulting from the initiation of the protocol by a specic node, followed by a consensus. Another dierence is that the General itself is one of the nodes, so if it is faulty there are only f − 1 potential faults left. Termination: Lemma 3 implies that if any correct node decides, all decide and stop. Assume that no correct node decides. In this case, no correct node ever invokes a broadcast (p, v, T +d, _). By the consensus-broadcast properties in [9] , no correct node will ever be considered as broadcaster. Therefore, by time T + (2f + 3)d on their timers, all correct nodes will have at most f broadcasters and will abort and stop.
Agreement: If no correct node decides, then all abort, and return to the same value. Otherwise, let q be the rst correct node to decide. Therefore, no correct node aborts. The value returned by q is the value v of the accepted (p, v, T +d, 1) message. By the consensus-broadcast properties in [9] , all correct nodes accept (p, v, T +d, 1) and no correct node accepts (p, v , T +d, 1) for v = v . Thus all correct nodes return the same value.
Validity: If the initiator q is correct, all the correct nodes invoke the consensusbroadcast with the same value v and invoke the protocol with the same timer time (T +d). By the consensus-broadcast properties in [9] , all correct nodes will stop and return v .
Thus the proof of the theorem is concluded.
